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Why do for-profit firms take voluntary steps to improve the environment? Brand appeal to 
green consumers or investors, the ability to influence or avoid regulation, or the experience 
gained for future regulation, have all been suggested as possible reasons. The empirical 
evidence is decidedly mixed. This paper uses 19 years of monthly stock price returns to 
examine the profitability of participation in the world’s largest voluntary greenhouse gas 
mitigation program: the Chicago Climate Exchange. After controlling for systemic market 
risk as well as industry-specific shocks, we find no statistically significant impact of 
announcing to join CCX on excess returns. However, the market appeared to be sensitive to 
changes in abatement costs implied by CCX membership. Most strikingly, the progress of 
proposed greenhouse gas legislation (the Waxman-Markey bill) had a positive impact on 
excess returns for CCX member firms, suggesting that the most profitable incentive for firms 
to join CCX is to prepare for future regulation. Our results imply that relying on voluntary 
approaches alone to combat climate change may not be enough. 
JEL-Code: Q530, Q540. 
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April 14, 2011 1 Introduction
The seductive idea of voluntary environmental action by ﬁrms has long held the imagi-
nation of the public and of politicians. If companies can reduce emissions of their own
accord, the thinking goes, then government regulation will not be needed and consumers
can consume guilt-free. There is an ongoing debate about whether this virtuous cycle
of proﬁtability and environmental responsibility exists. The debate is relevant because
if voluntary approaches are successful, they can be used to relax or replace regulation,
providing with ﬁrms the maximum amount of ﬂexibility (Alberini and Segerson, 2002;
Khanna, 2001).
US Climate policy forms a particularly important example of whether voluntary ap-
proaches can obviate regulation. At the time of this writing, the USA is the only indus-
trialized country in the world that does not regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
on a national level but instead relies on voluntary ﬁrm action.1
There are theoretical arguments both in favor and against the proﬁtability of vol-
untary spending on environmental performance, and a growing empirical literature that
examines the relationship between environmental and ﬁnancial performance. Our pa-
per contributes to this literature by studying the effect of membership in the Chicago
Climate Exchange (CCX), the world’s largest voluntary GHG cap-and-trade market.
CCX was established in 2003 to provide a formal market for ﬁrms to voluntarily, but
veriﬁably, reduce GHG emissions. In contrast to other voluntary GHG programs, CCX
includes both strict provisions and standards for the auditing of emissions reductions,
and a formal market for the purchase of abatement credits. In that sense, the CCX is
1Although the EPA changed its policy and now includes CO2 as an air pollutant, there are no federal
standards, taxes or other regulation that puts a price on CO2 emissions. Regional and local initiatives
exist, however, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California’s Global Warming
Solutions Act (AB 32).
3the closest voluntary equivalent to a mandatory carbon market, the policy instrument of
choice in most countries to reduce GHG emissions of industry. To our knowledge, this
is the ﬁrst attempt to examine the effect of CCX membership on ﬁrm performance. Our
ﬁndings therefore have an immediate relevance for environmental regulation and policy.
The empirical literature about the proﬁtability of voluntary environmental spending
can be separated into two broad groups. The ﬁrst compares ﬁnancial performance of a
”green” portfolio with that of other portfolios over time, usually based on some envi-
ronmental performance index.2 The main challenges with this method are unobserved
heterogeneity (Telle, 2006) and the identiﬁcation of the effect of voluntary action. Even
if an unbiased estimator of the effect is found, the direction of causation cannot be
resolved: Are green ﬁrms more proﬁtable because they are green, or are they green
because they can afford to be?
The second thread of literature comprises studies that measure the effect of a dis-
crete event in time (e.g. the discharge of toxic waste) on ﬁrm proﬁts.3 Studies of this
type offer an advantage in identiﬁcation and causation inference relative to the long-
term comparison of portfolios, but suffer from the limitation that only environmental
performance that is ”time stamped” can be investigated.
Our paper is in the spirit of an event study but also contains a long-term component.
Our primary focus is on estimating the effect of discrete events on ﬁrm proﬁts, such as
announcements to join CCX and political information relevant for this market, partic-
ularly the passing ’Waxman-Markey’ bill in the US House of Representatives, which
arguably raised the likelihood of a mandatory cap-and-trade system being instituted in
2E. g., Derwall et al. (2005); Dowell et al. (2000); Hart and Ahuja (1996); King and Lenox (2001);
Russo and Fouts (1997); Yamashita et al. (1999); Ziegler et al. (2007).
3E. g. Dasgupta et al. (2001); Filbeck and Gorman (2004); Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (1998); Gupta
and Goldar (2005); Khanna et al. (1998); Konar and Cohen (1997, 2001); Muoghalu et al. (1995).
4the medium term. We additionally include long-term information about marginal abate-
ment costs implied by CCX membership, which we proxy with the CCX carbon price.
Our sample covers 18 years of monthly data, a time-scale common to portfolio-type
studies. By combining elements from both approaches we are able to identify the effect
of membership while incorporating long-term information about marginal abatement
costs and excess returns of CCX members compared to their industry rivals that chose
not to participate.
We employ an extension of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to explore
ﬁrm performance, as measured through excess share returns of US equities. We adjust
CCX member returns for overall market risk, as well as for excess returns of indus-
try rivals deﬁned on the 4-digit SIC level, and include time dummies to mark discrete
events. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of joining CCX, but member ﬁrm returns are neg-
atively correlated with CCX carbon price changes over time, indicating that increased
abatement costs have a negative impact on returns. Importantly, the passing of the
Waxman-Markey climate bill led to positive and statistically signiﬁcant excess returns
for CCX member ﬁrms, implying that ﬁrms who had gained experience in the voluntary
were believed to be better prepared for the possibly imminent mandatory market (the
mandatory market has in fact not materialized to date).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide background on the
Chicago Climate Exchange, as well as a review of relevant literature. Section 3 presents
our methodology and describes the data. In Section 4, we report and discuss our results,
and Section 5 concludes.
52 Background
At the time of the Kyoto Protocol under the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, the U.S. was the largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world, and
therefore the most prominent non-participant. While that process ultimately resulted in
a market for tradable carbon offsets in Europe, the lack of an agreement or legislation
in the US meant that emission of greenhouse gases remained unregulated. In 2003, the
Chicago Climate Exchange opened a trading exchange for voluntary greenhouse gas
emissions reductions and offsets in North America and Brazil. CCX has been followed
by a host of nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt companies that seek to generate, ﬁnance, sell, and
market emissions reductions and offsets.4
2.1 The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX)
The Chicago Climate Exchange is by far the largest voluntary GHG market to date. Un-
der CCX, member ﬁrms pay an annual membership fee and agree to voluntarily reduce
their emissions of greenhouse gases. The fee ranges from $1,000 to $35,000 per year
depending on the size of the ﬁrm and the type of membership. Although participation is
voluntary, compliance with emission reduction objectives becomes legally binding once
a member joins.
All emission baselines and annual emission reports receive independent veriﬁca-
tion.5 Members commit to reduce their emissions by a ﬁxed amount below the estab-
lished baseline level. Firms who reduce beyond their target receive surplus allowances
4A review of the CCX and other voluntary programs can be found in Kollmuss et al. (2008).
5There are 3 classes of membership on CCX: Members, participant members, and associate members.
Participant members establish a registry and get their emissions veriﬁed, but don’t make any commitment
on emissions reduction. Associate members have negligible direct emissions, but pledge to report and
fully offset their indirect emissions. We focus here solely on full members.
6to sell or bank; those who do not meet the targets comply by purchasing emissions al-
lowances, called ’Carbon Financial Instrument’ (CFI) contracts, which represent 100
metric tons of CO2 equivalent (CO2e ). CFI contracts consist of exchanged allowances
and offset credits. Offset projects are aggregated if less than 10,000 metric tonnes of
CO2e. A history of the CCX carbon price, the market price for allowances and the
effective marginal abatement cost member ﬁrms, is given in Figure 1 below.
There are two distinct phases to the CCX membership program. During phase 1,
from 2003 to 2006, members agreed to cut their emissions by 1% each year below their
baseline average (1998 to 2001), thereby by achieving a reduction of 4% by the end
of the fourth year . During phase 2, from 2007 to 2010, members have to further cut
their annual emissions to achieve the target of 6% by 2010 . New members who did not
participate in the ﬁrst phase phase therefore had to reduce emissions by 1.5% per year
to reach the new goal.
Qualifying projects for CCX can be located in any country except those listed in
Annex 1 of the Kyoto protocol. However, projects developed under Kyoto’s Clean
Development Mechanisms (carried out in non-Annex 1 countries) can be traded under
CCX, provided the project is approved.
2.2 Related literature
The literature about voluntary investments revolves around the question of whether non-
mandated investments in environmental performance can be beneﬁcial to ﬁrms and
shareholders. Proposed answers range from a ﬂat-out rejection of voluntary environ-
mental investment (Friedman, 1970) to a belief that such investments will not only pay
for themselves, but will generate a proﬁt in most cases (Porter and van der Linde, 1995).
7Figure 1: CCX carbon price (in US $ per t CO2, 2004-2009)
A general discussion about when corporate social responsibility (CSR), of which volun-
tary environmental action constitutes a subgroup, can be found in Heal (2005). Khanna
(2001) categorizes existing voluntary approaches and gives an excellent overview of the
literature about ﬁrms’ incentives to participate.
Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) develop a theoretical model that leads ﬁrms to
over-comply with environmental regulation. In their model, consumers all have green
preferences but varying income levels, leading to a market segmentation based on will-
ingness and ability to pay. An important assumption in the model is that ﬁrms are able
to effectively and credibly communicate the ”greenness” embedded in their product, a
point also emphasized by Reinhardt (1999). More generally, voluntary green spending
can be viewed as a form of advertising or marketing, allowing the ﬁrm to gain market
share when environmental quality is valued by consumers. In an econometric study, An-
ton et al. (2004) ﬁnd that consumer pressure is the dominant factor in explaining ﬁrm
8voluntary environmental investment.
Another rationale for voluntary environmental improvement comes from the in-
vestor side. Heinkel et al. (2001) construct a model where a subset of investors have
green preferences and refuse to hold stock from ”dirty” ﬁrms. If the pool of green in-
vestors is large enough, equity from green ﬁrms will sell at a premium, leading to lower
capital costs for these ﬁrms.
Nehrt (1996) examines timing and intensity of environmental investment, and ﬁnds
that ﬁrst movers proﬁt more from investment. These ideas of getting a head start and
forcing rivals to follow suit are closely related to the literature about ”raising rivals’
costs”, where a dominant ﬁrms seeks to gain market share at the expense of its rivals
by increasing (everyone’s) costs (Hart and Tirole, 1990; Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986;
Salop and Scheffman, 1983, 1987). This is a proﬁtable strategy if the dominant ﬁrm’s
average cost increase is less than the marginal cost increase of its rivals. The cost in-
crease can take many forms, including triggering new standards by over-complying with
current regulation.
Another important advantage of voluntary investment is the experience gained in
abatement, which may make it less costly to comply if regulation is later imposed.
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) propose several pathways for voluntary environmental
investment, including the establishment of industry-wide guidelines. If these guidelines
become regulation it will presumably be closer to the ﬁrm’s needs than exogenously
imposed rule. According to such thinking, ﬁrms may over-comply with environmen-
tal standards not to trigger, but to prevent, shape and/or prepare for future regulation.
Khanna (2001) provides an extended discussion on this point. Our results suggest that
this pathway could play an important role in voluntary participation in CCX.
Lastly, there may be strategic reasons to engage in voluntary action, because long-
9term ﬁrm proﬁts depend on a range of different stakeholders, not only including con-
sumers and investors but also workers, labor unions, municipalities, as well as different
levels of government. Even though voluntary action may be costly in the short run,
improved relations with stakeholders may more than recover the costs in the long-run
(Barnett and Salomon, 2006; McWilliams et al., 2006).
Regardless of the particular motivation to participate in voluntary action, the un-
derlying idea is always that the beneﬁts outweigh the costs, with the consequence that
voluntary action is proﬁtable. This is the starting point for empirical studies, which aim
to identify a link between environmental and ﬁnancial performance. Most empirical
papers have focused on local pollutants such as toxic waste. Konar and Cohen (1997),
for instance, examines the efﬁcacy of the Toxic Releases Inventory (TRI), a database
which tracks releases of toxic pollutants, on stock market performance, and ﬁnds that
ﬁrms with large releases were punished by the market. Other empirical papers ﬁnd a
positive relationship between environmental and ﬁnancial performance6 Dowell et al.
(2000) ﬁnd that multinational ﬁrms that adhere to a single stringent environmental stan-
dard worldwide, rather than adopting respective local standards, have a higher market
valuation as measured by Tobin’s q.
Other papers using local emissions data do not ﬁnd a relationship between environ-
mental and market performance (Filbeck and Gorman, 2004; King and Lenox, 2001;
Telle, 2006). Derwall et al. (2005) provide evidence of substantially higher returns from
a portfolio of ’socially responsible’ ﬁrms from 1995-2003, but struggle with establish-
ing causation: it could be the case that better-performing ﬁrms subsequently polish their
social and environmental credentials as absolution, rather than as a means to prosper.
6see, for example, Hart and Ahuja (1996); Khanna et al. (1998); King and Lenox (2002); Konar and
Cohen (2001); Muoghalu et al. (1995); Russo and Fouts (1997).
10Voluntary emission reduction of a global stock pollutant (e.g. our case of voluntary
GHG abatement) is different to reducing local pollution in several important ways. On
the one hand, GHG emissions of any single ﬁrm are unlikely to yield a visible envi-
ronmental impact. This means that consumers and investors have to be informed about
climate change (and a ﬁrm’s contribution of GHG) in order to prefer, and have increased
willingness to pay for, products or equity in the GHG-reducing ﬁrm vis-` a-vis their com-
petitors. On the other hand, the global nature of GHG emissions can potentially send
positive signals far beyond a local region. For example, Japanese consumers may value
a reduction of GHG emissions by a US ﬁrm as much as American consumers, which is
presumably not the case for a reduction in local pollution. Many of the CCX member
ﬁrms are globally traded ﬁrms, and some also sell their products on the global market.
Oberndorfer (2009) ﬁnds that excess returns of EU electricity generators are posi-
tivelyrelatedtothemarketpriceofcarbon. AlthoughtheEUEmissionsTradingScheme
is a mandatory market and therefore the question of the costs and participation are very
different, to the context of voluntary action, there is a close relationship between Obern-
dorfer’s paper and our study because of the focus on the link between ﬁrm proﬁts and
carbon prices, as well as the modeling approach.7 The positive correlation between EU
carbon prices and ﬁrms’ returns may at ﬁrst seem surprising, given that higher marginal
abatement costs imply higher overall costs and thus lower proﬁts. However, due to a
combination of cost pass-through to consumers and a very generous free allocation pol-
icy, regulated ﬁrms actually received a windfall from the institution of the carbon market
(Hintermann, 2011; Sijm et al., 2006). Furthermore, it is not clear that the EUA carbon
price during that time actually reﬂected marginal abatement costs (Hintermann, 2010).
7Oberndorfer uses a CAPM that controls for market risk and other determinants such as fuel and
electricity prices. The nature of the mandatory market does not allow for controlling for industry rival
returns, because all rivals within the same SIC code are covered by the market as well.
11Jacobs et al. (2010) ﬁnd mixed evidence of voluntary action on ﬁrm performance:
announcements of philanthropic gifts for environmental causes or ISO environmental
standards certiﬁcations are associated with signicant positive market reaction, while
voluntary emission produce a negative effect. While discrete actions may have some
effect on the market valuation of a ﬁrm, simple sharing of information may not. Mal-
lory (2009) examines the market performance of ﬁrms which voluntarily disclose their
carbon emissions. Using a propensity score matching technique, she ﬁnds no statistical
difference with ﬁrms that do not disclose emissions.
Amongst the literature that examines voluntary GHG action by ﬁrms, two papers are
closely related to ours in terms of content and methodology. Fisher-Vanden and Thor-
burn (1998) carry out an event study among US ﬁrms that joined the voluntary programs
Climate Leaders and Ceres, both of which aim to reduce GHG emissions. Matching
daily stock data with ﬁrm announcements to join either of these programs, they ﬁnd that
announcement returns (measured as cumulative excess returns) were negative, both in
absolute terms as well as relative to their industry rivals. When ﬁrms subsequently an-
nounced an emissions reduction goal, excess returns declined even more. Their results
varied somewhat by industry as well as by the book-to-market ratio, but they conclude
that for the ﬁrms in their sample, voluntary environmental action was not proﬁtable.
Ziegler et al. (2009) compare the average stock performance of portfolios of US and
European stock that differ in their climate-related policies, using a very similar method-
ologyasourpaper. Actiontakenbyﬁrms, suchasannouncingemission-reductiongoals,
or press releases relating to climate change, were seen to reduce average returns over the
sample period (2001-2006) in all markets. While this was true for the US stock market
over the entire sample period, in Europe the effect changed sign in 2003, when the EU
adopted a more forceful approach to combating climate change.
123 Model and data
3.1 Model
To the extent that the stock market correctly prices securities, returns constitute a mea-
sure for (a change in) expected future proﬁtability. Our goal is to identify the effect of
joining CCX on returns in the spirit of an event study, while controlling for continuous
variables such as abatement costs. The main difﬁculty is that stock returns are driven
by a host of things, both observable and unobservable. In order to identify the impact
of CCX membership we have to control for a series of factors.
We start with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) originally developed by
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965); for a review of its history, see Fama and French
(2004). According to the CAPM, risk-adjusted excess returns from holding a particular
security are equal to overall market returns, or
E[ri]   rf
i




where E[ri] is the expected return on asset i (which can be a portfolio or an individual
security, if the latter is to be added to a well-diversiﬁed portfolio), rf is the risk-free
rate of interest, and E[rm] is the expected rate of return of the stock market as a whole.
The difference between the return from a risky asset and the risk-free rate of interest is
known as the excess return or the risk premium.
The adjustment factor i measures the sensitivity of expected excess returns for a
particular security to expected excess returns of the market. In particular, it adjusts for
market or systemic risk, which is the part of overall risk that cannot be diversiﬁed away
by combining a sufﬁciently large number of stocks into one portfolio. In the original
13CAPM, this is the only variable (or ”factor”) that determines the average return of an
asset. Because of this, it is also known as the 1-factor model and usually expressed by
restating (1) in terms of excess returns:
E[ri]   rf = i(E[rm]   rf)
The associated empirical regression equation is derived by adding a time dimension,
a constant, and replacing the expectations with an error term:
rit   rft = i + i(rmt   rft) + it (2)
E[it] = 0; V ar[it] = 
2
The constant is known as Jensen’s alpha. Since a nonzero value for i indicates an
over- or undervaluation of an asset which in an efﬁcient market should be arbitraged
away, the null hypothesis is always that i = 0. The adjustment factor is unity for the
market overall by construction. For an asset with a higher systemic risk than the market
overall, i > 1, and vice versa.
To address some of the anomalies observed in stock markets (e.g. Banz (1981);
De Bondt and Thaler (1985)), Fama and French (1992, 1993) extended the 1-factor
modeltoadjustforpriceeffectsrelatedtoﬁrmsizeandvalue. Carhart(1997);Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993, 2001); Rouwenhorst (1998) added a fourth factor in order to address
momentum trading strategies, leading to the following speciﬁcation, sometimes called
the ”4-factor” model:
rit   rft = i + i1(rmt   rft + i2SMBt + i3HMLt + i4MOMt + it (3)
14The variable or factor SMBt stands for small-minus-large and is computed as the
difference between the returns of a portfolio comprising small ﬁrms minus that of a
portfolio of large ﬁrm stock. HMLt (high-minus-low) refers to the valuation of a stock
relative to company assets and is the return of a portfolio of stocks with a high book-
to-market ratio (growth stocks) minus a portfolio of stock where book-to-market is low
(blue chips). Finally, MOMt is known as the momentum factor and is calculated as the
difference between the return of a portfolio comprised of winning stocks minus and re-
turn of a portfolio of losing stock. These factors are calculated on average returns from
6 different portfolios, characterized by ﬁrm size (market equity or the value of outstand-
ing shares) and ﬁrm book-to-market equity.8 Data for SMBt, HMLt and MOMt for
the US stock market are available from Kenneth French’s online data library.9
The 4-factor model has gained wide acceptance in the ﬁnancial community and is
the most common asset pricing model in applied work (e.g. Bollen and Busse (2005);
L’Her et al. (2004); Ziegler et al. (2009)).
Non-systemic or idiosyncratic asset risk can be diversiﬁed away by including a suf-
ﬁcient number of imperfectly correlated assets into a single portfolio and is thus not re-
ﬂected in average security prices according to equations (2) and (3), even though ﬁrm-
or industry-level shocks naturally affect individual asset returns. While this is not a
problem to price average stock or portfolio returns, excluding all ﬁrm-speciﬁc informa-
tion would make no sense for our purpose. We therefore apply (3) to individual stocks
rather than a portfolio in our main model10 and extend it in the following way:
8Book equity captures a ﬁrm’s total assets minus liabilities and is deﬁned as the value of stockholders’
equity plus the value of deferred taxes and investment tax credit, minus the value of preferred stock.
9http : ==mba:tuck:dartmouth:edu=pages=faculty=ken:french=datalibrary:html
10For a balanced panel with NxT observations, forming cross-section averages per time period and
regressing them on common market factors in a time series regression with T observation yields the
same point estimates as regressing individual stock returns on the same factors. In (our) case of an
unbalanced panel, the point estimates will slightly differ because the portfolio approach equally weights
15First, we include a dummy that marks CCX membership. Since the market incor-
porates information as soon as it becomes available (whether it does so fully and/or
immediately is a matter of some dispute in the empirical literature), we use ﬁrm an-
nouncements to join CCX rather than the actual joining dates. We also account for
market exits by ﬁrms leaving the system at the end of Phase I in 2003. No member ﬁrm
has exited the system during the (current) second phase.
Second, because the likelihood of regulation is one of the justiﬁcations for joining
a voluntary emissions reduction program such as CCX, we are interested in using a
regulatory expectations proxy in our data. We restrict our attention to federal legislation
because that is the level at which minimum compliance standards are set in the United
States.11 We focus our attention on the Waxman-Markey bill (the ’American Clean
Energy and Security Act’), which sought to limit the emission of greenhouse gases and
establish an emissions-trading scheme. We add a dummy for active CCX membership
for June 2009, the month when the Waxman-Markey bill was passed in the US House
of Representatives. The bill established the ground for a federal mandated cap-and-
trade system. Our hypothesis is that this should have raised investors’ assessment of
the probability that a mandatory federal cap-and-trade system would be instituted in the
medium term. In such a system, previous CCX membership is viewed as an advantage
because these ﬁrms already have market experience.12
time averages, whereas the individual stock regression gives equal weight to all observations, implying a
greater weight for months with more data. The interpretation of  and 1;:::;4 remains unchanged.
11California has the unique ability among states to set even more stringent environmental regulations
than federal law speciﬁes, but it must meet the minimum. Other states can then adopt the California
variant if they prefer.
12Prospects for a federal cap-and-trade system increased suddenly with the passing of the Waxman-
Markey bill, but they faded out very slowly. Climate legislation passed the U.S. House of Representatives,
but faced a deepening recession and declining support in the Senate. On February 1, 2010, Reuters
reported that the Obama White House dropped any projected revenue from carbon auctions. Later in the
same year, the bill was effectively tabled in the Senate, and at the time of writing no federal cap-and-trade
system seems likely to gather congressional support in the foreseeable future.
16Third, we incorporate information about the costs of emissions abatement implied
by CCX membership. We proxy these costs by using the CCX carbon price, which,
according to permit trading theory, should be equal to marginal abatement costs.13 Even
though we don’t have information about total compliance costs (which depend on the to-
tal emissions reduction goal committed to by a particular ﬁrm as well as infra-marginal
costs), marginal abatement costs are a useful proxy since we work with ﬁrst differences
rather than levels. A change in marginal abatement costs translates to a change in over-
all compliance costs, which in turn implies lower proﬁtability and thus lower excess
returns, all else equal.14
Lastly, we include excess returns from industry rivals deﬁned by 4-digit SIC code,
which are not CCX members. This ensures that shocks affecting the industry but not
the market overall are not confounded with the effect of membership, the Waxman-
Markey bill or the carbon price. In other words, a positive coefﬁcient on the dummy for
joining CCX cannot be due to a positive shock on the industry level in the same month,
because this is already accounted for in industry excess returns. Because the inclusion
of industry-speciﬁc returns alters the magnitude and interpretation of the ’s in (2-3),
we present our results separately with and without them.15
We use monthly data for our analysis. The signal-to-noise ratio of daily returns is
13The fact that the program is voluntary does not change the basic price mechanism of a permit market.
Firms will abate emissions rather than buying offsets as long as it is cheaper to do so, i.e. up to the point
where marginal abatement costs equal the CCX permit price.
14If ﬁrms are able to pass on all of the compliance costs to consumers, proﬁts do not have to decrease
necessarily. Consider, however, that CCX membership is not very widespread, such that most ﬁrms’
industry rivals do not face any GHG compliance costs at all. Under these circumstances it is doubtful that
member ﬁrms can fully pass on their costs.
15The common variation between industry returns and overall market returns is excluded from the
regression when estimating the coefﬁcients, reducing the absolute value of 1 far below unity; however,
it would be wrong to conclude from this coefﬁcient that the non-diversiﬁable risk stock of CCX member
stocks is particularly low. Although 1 still correctly adjusts asset returns for whole market returns, the
relationship between its value and unity is lost due to the inclusion of industry returns.
17often very low. If the noise is orthogonal to the effect of joining (as proper noise should
be), then monthly data could potentially reveal what daily data cannot. Using monthly
data also mitigates the problem of how quickly markets assimilate new information.
Fully efﬁcient markets should do so immediately, but in practice there is often a delay.
Using daily excess returns on the day of the announcement, or perhaps the day plus the
two following days, risks missing any delayed effect, which is captured almost certainly
with a monthly approach.
The other side of the medal when using monthly data is that too many days may be
included. If a small effect is averaged over an entire month, it may become so small as
not to be detectable.
3.2 Econometric speciﬁcation
Because the CAPM is speciﬁed in (proportional) ﬁrst differences, i.e. returns, we have
to either explicitly or implicitly take ﬁrst differences of all variables that we include in
the model. This leads to the following regression equation:
rit   rft = + 1(rmt   rft) + 2SMBt + 3HMLt + 4MOMt
(4)
+ 1JOINit + 2WAXit  Mit + 3Ct  Mit + 4(r
sic
it   rft) + it
We set JOINit = 1 in the month of the announcement, as well as for the following
month if the announcement occurred in the second half of the month. This ensures that
enough time is included to capture any excess returns due to joining, even if markets
react with some delay. At a minimum, 16 calendar days are included in the announce-
18ment dummy (if the announcement falls on the 15th of a month), and a maximum of 46
calendar days (if the announcement falls on the 16th). We further set JOINit = -1 when
a ﬁrm leaves the system, and zero otherwise; it can be thought of the ﬁrst difference of
a dummy that is 1 during membership and zero otherwise.
WAXit is a dummy equal to 1 in June and July 2009, and zero otherwise, consistent
with the ﬁrst difference of a dummy that is zero before the bill was passed, and one
afterwards. The variable Ct = Ct   Ct 1 refers to the ﬁrst difference of the CCX
carbon price, and (rsic
it   rft) refers to excess returns of industry rivals on the 4-digit
SIC level.
The membership dummy Mit is one for ﬁrms that are active CCX members at time
t, and zero otherwise. Multiplying Ct by Mit is necessary because ﬁrms that are not
CCX members face no price on emissions. Interacting Mit with WAXit measures the
effect of the Waxman-Markey bill only on current members. We estimate eq. (4) by
OLS.
Theﬁrst-differencingismorethanjustatechnicaldetail, butitreﬂectsafundamental
assumption underlying the CAPM. If markets are efﬁcient, they incorporate information
immediately. Stock prices are forward-looking in the sense that they reﬂect the present
value of the expected stream of future dividends, a measure which includes all future
expected proﬁts. If joining CCX makes a ﬁrm more proﬁtable (e.g. due to higher
sales, lower costs, or any other pathway discussed above), arbitrage mandates that asset
prices increase immediately to fully incorporate the newly updated expectations. Prices
will remain high, but returns should adjust only once, assuming that investors are fully
informed. Therefore, including a dummy that marks active membership rather than
entry and exit into (4), or including the carbon price level rather than ﬁrst differences,
would contradict the assumption of efﬁcient markets.
193.3 Data
Our data consists of monthly stock prices taken from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) for the years 1991 - 2009. The CRSP is a database of daily and monthly
stock prices for publicly-listed ﬁrms in the United States going back to 1925.16 We
calculate our dependent variable, monthly excess return, by subtracting the risk-free rate
of interest (RF) from the monthly average stock prices. The risk-free rate of interest is
captured by using the effective federal funds rate of interest.17
We gathered data on CCX membership from the CCX website, which publishes a di-
rectory of current and former members. To ﬁnd the speciﬁc date when ﬁrms announced
their decision to join, we used ﬁnancial news outlets such as Reuters, Lexus-Nexus, en-
vironmental news wires, general web searches, as well as companies own news releases.
We believe that the date of announcement is the best representative date of membership
because the stock price would react from the announcement rather than from the indi-
vidual (potentially unpublicized) actions that were taken as conditions of membership.
A total of 109 entities are listed as members on the CCX exchange, of which 55 are
ﬁrms that are listed on a US stock market (NASDAQ, NYSE or AMEX). The majority
of the nonlisted entities are cities, states and universities. We were able to identify an
announcement date to join CCX for 34 of the listed ﬁrms. Table 1 contains descriptive
statistics of our sample. The sample size for the market variables MEXRET, RF, HML,
SMB and MOM reﬂects the number of months in our sample period.
The 34 ﬁrms in our sample contain 24 different 4-digit SIC codes. Member ﬁrms
16CRSP is maintained at the University of Chicago, and is frequently used as a source of data for
ﬁnancial studies. For more information, see: http://www.crsp.com/.
17The effective federal funds rate is a weighted average of rates on brokered trades. Monthly ﬁgures
include each calendar day in the month, and are annualized using a 360-day year or bank interest. Infor-
mation and data are available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/statisticsdata.htm.
20Table 1: Descriptive statistics in sample period (Jan. 1991-Dec. 2009)
N Mean St. Dev Min Max
   Market 
MEXRET 228 0.0055 0.0443 -0.1854 0.1104
RF 228 0.0030 0.0015 0 0.0056
HML 228 0.0008 0.0358 -0.2199 0.1380
SMB 228 0.0049 0.0340 -0.0989 0.1387
MOM 228 0.0055 0.0544 -0.3469 0.1835
   CCX Members with announcement information (34 firms)
RET 6'290 0.0098 0.1029 -0.8702 1.2235
CAP 6'290 20'657 42'287 4.2128 501'513
   4-digit SIC-Rivals (19,144 firms)
RET 106'103 0.0106 0.1833 -0.9641 13.4951
CAP 106'103 3'971 16'418 0.0089 489'845
MEXRET: Market return-RF (risk-free rate of interest); HML-MOM: Defined in text
RET: Return; CAP: Market capitalization (shares outstanding x price, in mio $)
tend to be larger on average than their industry rivals (nonmember ﬁrms sharing the
same 4-digit SIC code), as membership in a carbon trading market makes no sense for
very small ﬁrms. However, the average ﬁrm return RET18 is statistically indistinguish-
able for members and non-member rivals.
4 Results
Coefﬁcient estimates from OLS regression of (4) are given in Table 2. To test whether
different industries have different intercepts (i.e. different ’s), we also carried out a
ﬁxed effects (FE) regression based on 2-digit SIC classiﬁcation but were not able to
reject the null hypothesis that the industry intercepts were all identical, indicating that
pooling the data and applying OLS is appropriate.
The ﬁrst two columns show the results for the 1-factor and 4-factor versions of
18This variable is deﬁned in the CRSP database as the simple monthly difference in stock price, here
with the dividend payments stripped out for simplicity. See the CRSP data guide for more information.
21our model without controlling for industry-speciﬁc returns (Models 1a-b). The results
indicate that the systemic risk inherent in stock from CCX members is almost exactly
that of the market (1  1), and Jensen’s  is not signiﬁcantly different from zero,
implying that a stock index comprised of CCX members would track the overall stock
market rather well. This reﬂects the wide variation of industries that CCX members
belong to. The size, value and momentum factors are all highly signiﬁcant.
The middle panel includes the industry adjustment (Model 2). Inclusion of excess
returns from industry rivals renders the size factor insigniﬁcant in the 4-factor model,
which may reﬂect a systematic ﬁrm size difference across industry codes. The other
factors remain signiﬁcant. The R squared and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
indicate that the 4-factor model ﬁts the data better and that adjusting for industry returns
increases the explanatory power of the model.
The announcement to join CCX does not appear to have had an impact on excess
returns in either model, neither positive nor negative. Adding a lagged version of the
JOIN dummy for all ﬁrms (not just those with an announcement date in the second
half of the month, for which the JOIN dummy already marks both the announcement
as well as the follow-up month) or restricting the dummy to the month of the announce-
ment only for all ﬁrms did not signiﬁcantly change the results. This could indicate that
investors had no strong belief whether joining CCX would lead to positive or negative
net costs, or else that the effect is small enough that it disappears using monthly returns.
Note that the estimated coefﬁcient on the JOIN dummy is positive in all speciﬁcations,
although it never reaches statistical signiﬁcance.
Investors reacted strongly to the passing of the Waxman-Markey bill, however. The
coefﬁcient on the WAX dummy is statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, indicating
that the investors believed that these ﬁrms had gained an advantage over their rivals due
22to their experience in a carbon market (again, adding a lagged dummy did not change
the results). The signiﬁcant announcement effect of this bill indicates that preparing for
regulation and thus gaining an advantage over rivals who have no experience may be
important in CCX membership.
The market is also sensitive to emission abatement costs incurred by CCX members,
as an increase in the carbon price signiﬁcantly reduces excess returns. Presumably, the
effect would be larger for ﬁrms that agreed to a greater level of abatement relative to
their past emissions, but we cannot control for this because we lack the corresponding
data. Controlling for emission intensity using 2-digit SIC coding (deﬁning codes 10-
14, 26, 28-29, 32-34 and 49 as emission-intensive industry groups) did not reveal a
difference between emission-intensive and other ﬁrms in terms of the announcement
effect and the sensitivity of returns to the carbon price.
The last panel in Table 2 contains the results of regressing a portfolio comprised of
CCX members on the market factors as well as the Waxman dummy and carbon price
changes. Naturally, controlling for industry rivals is not possible in a portfolio approach,
andneitheristheinclusionofﬁrm-speciﬁcinformationsuchasannouncementdates. On
the other hand, creating a portfolio reduces the overall variation of returns (this is the
point of diversiﬁcation), which leads to a better model ﬁt as evidenced in the higher R
squared of the portfolio model. For the variables where such a comparison is possible,
the portfolio model conﬁrms the results of the individual-stock regressions: The passing
of Waxman-Markey bill signiﬁcantly increased returns of member ﬁrms, and returns are
relatively correlated with carbon price changes.
235 Conclusions
The effect of voluntary investment in emissions abatement on ﬁrm proﬁts, and by ex-
tension on their their stock returns, is ambiguous ex ante. On theoretical grounds, both
an increase as well as a decrease in proﬁtability are possible, rendering the question and
empirical one.
We use monthly stock returns from 1991-2009 to test whether the announcement to
join CCX, the largest voluntary cap-and-trade market worldwide, produced positive or
negative excess returns for member ﬁrms. After controlling for systemic market risk
as well as shocks on the 4-digit SIC industry level, we ﬁnd that joining itself had no
impact on excess returns. However, we ﬁnd excess returns to be negatively associated
with changes in the CCX carbon price, and thus with changes in marginal abatement
costs. Since not joining CCX is associated with zero abatement costs, this result is an
indication that CCX membership is not viewed as proﬁtable from the market’s perspec-
tive, even though the announcement itself had no signiﬁcant effect (at least not one that
we can detect using monthly data).
However, the market reacted positively to the passing of the Waxman-Markey bill
in June 2009, which increased the likelihood of a federally mandated carbon market.
This ﬁnding is robust to a series of alternative model speciﬁcations, including treating
CCX ﬁrms as a portfolio and comparing them to the market overall. The positive excess
returns upon passing of the Waxman-Markey bill suggest that the most likely incentive
for ﬁrms to join CCX was to prepare for future regulation.
Our results do not back up the implications of corporate government theory, accord-
ing to which investments into non-mandated emission reductions is a waste of share-
holder money. By the same token, they also do not indicate that green investment pays.
24In particular, they do not bode well for the hopes that voluntary GHG reductions may
obviate the need for mandated programs, since it was precisely the (credible) threat of a
mandated program that was the source the positive market signal. Therefore, our results
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